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Abstract: I devise a new approach to evaluate the effectiveness of fiscal policy in the short-
run with multi-category treatment effects and inverse probability weighting based on the 
potential outcome framework. Our main contribution to the literature is the proposal of the 
modified conditional independence assumption to improve the evaluation of fiscal policy. 
Using this approach, I analyze the fiscal policy of the US economy. Our empirical study 
indicates that large fiscal contraction generates a negative effect on the growth rate of the 
economy, and small and large fiscal expansions realize a positive impact on the growth rate. 
However, their effectiveness is not significant in the traditional multiple regression approach. 
I conclude that our new approach significantly improves the evaluation of fiscal policy. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, Angrist and Kuersteiner (2011),  Angrist et al. (2017), and Jordà and Taylor (2016) 
developed a novel approach for the evaluation of macroeconomic policy interventions based 
on the causal model, which is proposed by ROSENBAUM and RUBIN (1983). In their approach, 
however, there is room for improvement in terms of evaluating the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy in the short-run because their standard form of the conditional independent 
assumption (CIA) is violated in the fiscal policy. Therefore, I devise a new approach, applying 
multi-category treatment effects and inverse probability weighting, with modifications of 
previous studies.1 The main contribution of this paper is that I modify the standard CIA to fit 
the fiscal policy. I stress that our modification is naturally required because government 
spending is included in the output of the economy. For example, government spending is a 
determining factor of the gross domestic product (GDP) of a country.  
 
Angrist et al. (2017) argue that there exist three most common approaches to estimate the 
effects of economic policy: dynamic general equilibrium models, vector autoregressive (VAR) 
models, and the narrative approach. They proposes a novel approach to analyze the effects 
of monetary policy based on ROSENBAUM and RUBIN (1983). Jordà and Taylor (2016) apply 
their approach to the fiscal consolidation. Peren Arin et al. (2015), however, argue that there 
has been a revival of interest in the relation between government spending and economic 
growth, not only fiscal consolidation after the global financial collapse in 2008. That is the 
reason why I focus on government spending in this paper. 
 
Using our approach, I analyze the fiscal policy of the US economy. Our empirical study 
indicates that large fiscal contraction generates a negative effect on the growth rate of the 
economy, and small and large fiscal expansions realize a positive impact on the growth rate 
because the coefficients of our regression are significant at the 5 percent level. In contrast, 
the results of the traditional multiple regression approach indicate that the effects of fiscal 
policy on the growth rate are not significant at the same level. Additionally, the coefficients 
of the approach based on standard CIA are greater than the estimates based on our approach. 
They indicate that adopting the standard CIA overestimates the effects of fiscal policy. I 
conclude that the slight modification realizes significant improvements on the fiscal policy 
debate. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe our new method and the modified 
conditional independence assumption. In section 3, the results of our empirical study on US 
fiscal policy are presented, and our conclusions and discussion are described in section 4. 
 
 
1
 Our approach is based on a simplified version of Angrist and Kuersteiner (2011),  Angrist et al. (2017), and Jordà and 
Taylor (2016) to  focus our modification of CIA. 
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2. Method 
Similar to Angrist and Kuersteiner (2011), Angrist et al. (2017), and Jordà and Taylor (2016), 
I adopt the potential outcome framework in the context of multi-category treatment effects. 
The economy is assigned one of 𝐽 possible levels (1, ⋯ , 𝑗, ⋯ , 𝐽) of fiscal policy in time period 
𝑡 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑇. For each time period 𝑡, I observe the random vector 𝑧𝑡 = (𝑦𝑡, 𝑞𝑡 , 𝒙𝑡
′ , 𝒛𝑡
′ )′, where  
𝑦𝑡 is the growth rate of output, 𝑞𝑡 ∈ (1, ⋯ , 𝐽) is the level of the growth rate of government 
spending,  𝒙𝑡  is a 𝑘 × 1  vector of covariates, and 𝒛𝑡  is a 𝑙 × 1  vector of macroeconomic 
variables. In the framework, the observed growth rate 𝑦𝑡 is assumed to satisfy the equation 
below. 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑑𝑡(1)𝑦𝑡(1) + ⋯ + 𝑑𝑡(𝐽)𝑦𝑡(𝐽), 
where 𝑑𝑡(𝑗) = 𝟏(𝑞𝑡 = 𝑗), 𝑦𝑡(1), ⋯ , 𝑦𝑡(𝐽) are 𝐽 potential outcomes, and 𝟏(∙) is the indicator 
function. 
 
Angrist and Kuersteiner (2011), Angrist et al. (2017), and Jordà and Taylor (2016) adopt the 
standard CIA and the no-empty-cell assumption as follows. 
Assumption 1. For all 𝑡 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑇: 
(a) (CIA) [𝑦𝑡+ℎ(𝑗) − 𝑦𝑡] ⊥ 𝑑𝑡(𝑗)|𝒙𝑡−𝑘, for all ℎ > 0, and 𝑘 ≥ 0, 
(b) (no-empty-cell) 0 < 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑝𝑗(𝒙𝒕), with 𝑝𝑗(𝒙𝒕) = ℙ(𝑞𝑡 = 𝑗|𝒙𝒕), 
where 𝑝𝑗(𝒙𝒕) is the generalized propensity score proposed by G. Imbens (2000).  
 
Although assumption 1(a) is standard in the causal model, which is proposed by ROSENBAUM 
and RUBIN (1983), it is not suitable for fiscal policy evaluation. Even if 𝒙𝑡−𝑘  is given, 
[𝑦𝑡+ℎ(𝑗) − 𝑦𝑡]  is not independent on 𝑑𝑡(𝑗)  because 𝑦𝑡  includes the growth rate of 
government spending 𝑔𝑡, and 𝑑𝑡(𝑗) is determined by 𝑔𝑡. Thus, in the fiscal policy evaluation, 
assumption 1(a) is violated. Assumption 1(b) says that for every possible 𝒙𝑡 in the population, 
there is a strictly positive probability that the economy with that covariate pattern could be 
assigned to each treatment level. This ensures that the generalized propensity score is 
bounded away from zero. This is an important condition for a semiparametric efficient 
estimation. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is that I modify the standard CIA to avoid its violation for 
fiscal policy evaluation. The modified conditional independence assumption (MCIA) and the 
standard no-empty-cell assumption is defined as follows: 
Assumption 2. For all 𝑗 = 1, ⋯ , 𝐽: 
(a) (MCIA) [𝑦𝑡+ℎ(𝑗) − ?̂?𝑡] ⊥ 𝑑𝑡(𝑗)|𝒙𝑡−𝑙, for all ℎ > 0, and 𝑙 ≥ 1, 
(b) (no-empty-cell) 0 < 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑝𝑗(𝒙𝑡), with 𝑝𝑗(𝒙𝑡) = ℙ(𝑤 = 𝑗|𝒙𝑡), 
where ?̂?𝑡 is a forecasted value of 𝑦𝑡 based on a vector of macroeconomic variables, 𝒛𝑡−1. ?̂?𝑡 
is independent on 𝑑𝑡(𝑗) and 𝑔𝑡 because it is a forecasted value based on 𝒛𝑡−1. Consequently, 
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assumption 2(a) is not violated in the fiscal policy evaluation. The assumption 2(b) is 
unchanged from 1(b). 
 
The estimand of interest is the improvement of growth rates, which are given by 𝝁 =
(𝜇1, ⋯ , 𝜇𝐽)
′
 with 𝜇𝑗 =  𝐸[𝑦𝑡+ℎ(𝑗) − ?̂?𝑡]. When 𝑞𝑡 = 𝑗 , assumption 2(a) implies that 
𝐸 [
𝑑𝑡+ℎ(𝑗)𝑦𝑡+ℎ(𝑗) − ?̂?𝑡
𝑝𝑗(𝒙𝑡−𝑙)
] = 𝐸 [𝐸 [
𝑑𝑡+ℎ(𝑗)𝑦𝑡+ℎ(𝑗)
𝑝𝑗(𝒙𝑡−𝑙)
|𝒙𝑡−𝑙]] − ?̂?𝑡
= 𝐸 [𝐸 [
1
𝑝𝑗(𝒙𝑡−𝑙)
|𝒙𝑡−𝑙] 𝐸[𝑑𝑡+ℎ(𝑗)|𝒙𝑡−𝑙]𝐸[𝑦𝑡+ℎ(𝑗)|𝒙𝑡−𝑙]] − ?̂?𝑡 = 𝐸[𝐸[𝑦𝑡+ℎ(𝑗)|𝒙𝑡−𝑙]] − ?̂?𝑡
= 𝐸[𝑦𝑡+ℎ(𝑗) − ?̂?𝑡] = 𝜇𝑗 . 
To estimate the estimand, I adopt inverse probability weighting (IPW). To keep this paper 
concise, I restrict 𝑙 to unity in this paper. 
 
Our approach is summarized below. The growth rate of government spending is classified 
into four groups: large fiscal contraction, small fiscal contraction, small fiscal expansion, and 
large fiscal expansion. 2 For the four groups, I use dummy variables that take only the value of 
0 or 1 to indicate the absence or presence of a categorical effect. The dependent variable 
[𝑦𝑡+ℎ(𝑗) − ?̂?𝑡] is calculated, where 𝑦𝑡 is the log of real gross domestic product (RGDP), and ?̂?𝑡 
is an estimate of 𝑦𝑡  based on the vector of quarterly macroeconomic variables, 𝒛𝑡−1 . I 
estimate weights, which is the inverse of the generalized propensity score, based on 𝒙𝑡 .
3 
Finally, I estimate the following equation (1) with weighted least squares (WLS) based on the 
weights. 
[𝑦𝑡+ℎ(𝑗) − ?̂?𝑡] = 𝛽1𝑓1 + 𝛽2𝑓2 + 𝛽3𝑓3 + 𝛽4𝑓4, (1) 
where 𝑓1 , 𝑓2 , 𝑓3 , and 𝑓4 are the dummy variables for the four groups of fiscal policy, 
respectively, and 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, and 𝛽4 are the estimators of the estimands. To keep our paper 
concise, I restrict ℎ to unity. 
3. Empirical study 
I conduct an empirical study on the fiscal policy of the US economy using quarterly time 
series as covariates and macroeconomic variables.4 The log of output 𝑦𝑡 is the log of RGDP, 
and ?̂?𝑡  is an estimate of 𝑦𝑡  based on 𝒛𝑡−1.
5  The covariates, 𝒙𝑡−1 , are the log-difference of 
 
2
 Suppose that 𝜎 is the standard deviation of 𝑔𝑡. Large fiscal contraction is 𝑔𝑡 ≤ −𝜎, small fiscal contraction is 
 −𝜎 < 𝑔𝑡 ≤ 0, small fiscal expansion is 0 < 𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝜎, and large fiscal expansion is 𝜎 < 𝑔𝑡.  
3
 Details of the generalized propensity score is described in the study by G. W. Imbens (2000). 
4
 Codes for our empirical study are provided in the following URL: https://github.com/koiti-yano/gov_spend_and_multi 
5
  The macroeconomic variables are RGDP, TED spread, commodity index, and unemployment 
rate. RGDP, commodity index, and unemployment rate are log-transformed, and RGDP and unemployment rate are 
seasonally adjusted. 
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RGDP, the log-difference of commodity index, and the difference of unemployment rate at 
time period 𝑡 − 1.  
 
Table 1 reports our results for equation (1). The first column, which is labeled WLS(A2), 
contains the results of the baseline model based on our new approach, and the second column, 
which is labeled OLS(A2), contains the results of the model with ordinary least squares. The 
third column, which is labeled WLS(A1), contains the results of the model with WLS based on 
assumption 1. 
 
The results of our baseline model are shown in the first column. They indicate that 
coefficients of large fiscal contraction, small fiscal expansion, and large fiscal expansion are 
significant at the 5 percent level. Additionally, they show that large fiscal contraction 
generates a negative effect on the growth rate of the economy, and small fiscal expansion and 
large fiscal expansion realize a positive impact on the growth rate because coefficients are 
significant at the 5 percent level, while the results of the second column indicate that the 
effects of fiscal policy on the growth rate are not significant at the 5 percent level. The 
comparison shows that adopting IPW and assumption 2 improves the estimation of the 
estimates. The third column reports the WLS estimates based on assumption 1. The estimates 
in the third column are greater than the estimates in the first column. They indicate that 
adopting assumption 1 overestimates the effects of fiscal policy. The results of Table 1 show 
that our approach improves the evaluation of fiscal policy.6 
 
 
TABLE 1 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR  [𝑦𝑡+ℎ(𝑗) − ?̂?𝑡]  
 
Independent variable WLS 
(A2) 
OLS (A2) WLS 
(A1) 
Large fiscal contraction (Intercept) -0.0028 
** 
-0.0014  0.0025 *  
 (0.0010)   (0.0010) (0.0012)   
Small fiscal contraction 0.0022    0.0008  0.0028    
 (0.0014)   (0.0013) (0.0017)   
Small fiscal expansion 0.0032 *  0.0020  0.0051 
** 
 (0.0014)   (0.0016) (0.0018)   
 
6
 I estimate equation (1) with maximum likelihood, and our conclusions are unchanged. 
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Large fiscal expansion 0.0035 *  0.0023  0.0049 
** 
 (0.0014)   (0.0012) (0.0017)   
Number of observations 109         109       109         
𝑅2 0.0655    0.0386  0.1001    
 
Notes: Table 1 reports our results for equation (1). The results of our baseline model 
are shown in the first column. They show that coefficients of large fiscal contraction, 
small fiscal expansion, and large fiscal expansion are significant at the 5 percent level. 
They indicate the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level. * 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
4. Conclusions and discussion  
In this paper, I devise a new approach based on Angrist and Kuersteiner (2011),  Angrist et 
al. (2017), and Jordà and Taylor (2016) by modifying the CIA to improve the evaluation of fiscal 
policy. Using this approach, I analyze the fiscal policy of the US economy. Our empirical study 
indicates that large fiscal contraction generates a negative effect on the economy, and large 
and small fiscal expansions in a quarter improve its growth rate in the next quarter, while its 
effectiveness is not significant in the traditional multiple regression approach at the 5 percent 
level. I conclude that our new approach significantly improves the evaluation of fiscal policy. 
To focus on our modified CIA and keep this paper concise, I adopt a simplified version of 
the approach, which is proposed in previous studies, and restrict ℎ =1 in our empirical study. 
In the further study, I extend our method to a more general form and ℎ > 1. Additionally, I 
analyze the fiscal policy of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
countries for international comparison and provide clear political implications. 
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